How One Law is Justified and How One Law is NOT Justified

Some One Law Messianics are using faulty epistemological justifications for their position.  When these well-meaning people use faulty justifications, the main-line Messianic leaders come along and refute these justifications and go away thinking that the One Law position lacks merit.  So let's talk about the epistemology of One Law, how it is justified and how it is not justified.  That way we'll be more effective in demonstrating the merits of the One Law position.





First, let's define One Law.  One Law means that all members of the New Covenant are obligated to follow all APPLICABLE mitzvot (i.e. Torah) as they apply under the NEW COVENANT (i.e. New Covenant halacha) regardless of whether the individual is ritually circumcised.  This doesn't mean that gentiles become Jews but rather that gentile become members of Israel (i.e. they become Israelites along with all of the other Israelites). I've discussed previously how to categorize the different rationales for One Law (see here).

Immediately you should notice that we're not talking about universal rights but rather rights that are specific to a particular political institution.  This should tell you that it is unhelpful and improper to speak of specific rights in general terms.  For the universal does not necessarily apply to the specific.  In fact, what we're doing is speaking contextually:  rights/duties within the context of the political institution of Israel.

Here's an illustration:

An Irishman cannot make himself a United States citizen by appealing to universal human rights.  Rather, he would have to contextualize his argument, refer to the context of American immigration law and make the case that he satisfied the requirement of that specific legal system.

In the same way, some One Law proponents try to justify their proposition by saying something like the following, "The Torah is good in so many ways.  G-d wants us to follow that which is good.  Therefore, I'm obligated to follow the Torah."  This type of justification is improper, citing a priori premises (knowable through mere reason) in order to infer an a posteriori conclusion (knowable only through revelation).  In other words, if the premises of an argument are de-contextualized and are used to infer a contextualized conclusion, the argument is a non-sequitur.  Consider, the proper method is to use contextualized premises (e.g. that provisions of immigration law have been fulfilled) in order to infer a contextualized conclusion (e.g. that one is therefore a United States citizen).

And now a few words about the specific context of covenantal law:

The context of One Law is covenant.  But which covenant?  In reality, the covenants are interrelated.  Torah refers to the covenantal tradition (masoret habrit).  We see this concept even in Paul's writings:

"remember that at that time you were separate from Christ, excluded from citizenship in Israel and foreigners to the COVENANTS [plural] of the promise" (Eph 2:12)

In other words, according to the legal theory of Judaism, to belong to one covenant meant to belong to them all.  For example, an Israelite belongs to the covenant created through Passover and completed at Sinai (i.e. the Israeli Covenant).  Yet to belong this Israeli Covenant means to belong to the Abrahamic covenant as well.

In the same way, to belong to the New Covenant does not negate one's responsibilities to follow the Mosaic Torah (i.e. all of the mitzvot given under the Old Covenant).  We see this, for example, in the concern of the Jerusalem Council in Acts 21 that Paul show himself to be a humble proponent of Mosaic Torah and the traditions of the fathers.  We also see in this passage that the Messianic Jews there in Jerusalem, many thousands of them, were ALL zealous for the law.  They all held the covenants to be interrelated--one of these interrelations or continuities being the mitzvot of the Old Covenant.

Yet there are discontinuities between the covenants:

(1) CHANGES IN WRITTEN TORAH:  narrow changes in the covenant give rise to narrow changes in the Written Torah.  For example, the Written Torah prescribed that only a Cohen could serve as the High Priest.  However, Yeshua became High Priest after an entirely different order, that of Melchizedek.  Thus, a change in covenant had a corresponding change in the Written Torah.  Another example is that only circumcised men could partake in the Passover sacrifice.  However, when Yeshua became the Passover Lamb, He made it possible that even uncircumcised men could partake in the Passover sacrifice.  Thus, again, a change in covenant had a corresponding change in the Written Torah.  And, in this case, an entirely different restriction was abolished.

(2) CHANGES IN ORAL TRADITION:  the application of the mitzvot (halacha) has changed as circumstances have changed.  A major halachic development under the new covenant was the granting of political rights to uncircumcised gentiles (Eph 2).

A major epistemological hurdle to One Law is responding to provisions of the Written Torah which limit full political rights to covenantal members--those who have been ritually circumcised.   After all, how can one propose that the uncircumcised gentiles have full political rights when Torah plainly limits full political rights to those who have been ritually circumcised?

I propose that the only way to respond to such provisions in Written Torah is to demonstrate that a covenantal change has occurred which relates directly to the restriction.  This is the only way to change the Written Torah.  As I've noted, there has indeed been a covenantal change directly related to Passover.  The New Testament says that Yeshua became our Passover Lamb.  Further, we see that this Passover was offered even to the uncircumcised (1 Cor. 5; 1 Cor. 11).  Since Passover was the institution that created Israel and, hence, citizenship in Israel, we can see why Paul was able to say that even uncircumcised men could now be considered fellow citizens in Israel (Eph 2)--they received citizenship through the Passover Lamb Yeshua!  Further, Yeshua's Passover inaugurated the New Covenant (1 Cor. 11).  As previously noted, the mitzvot are presumed to continue in each iteration of the covenant.  The fact that the prophets connect both categories of Torah (chukim and mishpatim) with the New Covenant serves to further corroborate this premise (Eze. 36).

Naturally, there are other justifications for the One Law position.  But I have demonstrated that this particular justification is perhaps the only justification to take the full context of covenantal law into account.  Thus, I believe it to be the best justification of all the possible justifications.  Nevertheless, see the link above to review other categories of justification for the One Law position.